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Depression is a debilitating mood disorder that has been linked to ruminative thinking. 
Clinical research has found connections between rumination, depression, and deficits in 
selective attention, especially for negative emotional material. However, results are 
inconsistent, especially regarding the role of ruminative thinking. In this context, 
rumination is usually operationalized as ineffective, intrusive, repetitive thinking about 
the symptoms, causes, and consequences of depression. However, Brinker and Dozois 
(2009) proposed that rumination forms a more general construct, independent of 
depression, but the relationship among this global rumination, depression, and selective 
attention has received little examination. The current study used a latent variables 
framework to analyze how emotional and non-emotional selective attention tasks relate to 
depressive symptoms, as measured by the CESD-R, and to both general rumination and 
rumination as a coping mechanism for depression. All forms of rumination formed a 
coherent construct, which could not be isolated from depressive symptoms as measured 
by the CESDR. Selective attention, regardless of item valence, was predictive of neither 
rumination nor depressive symptoms in the current study. Additionally, only non-
emotional Stroop and the emotional and non-emotional Flanker tasks had acceptably high 










Depression is a major mood disorder, distinguished by prolonged negative affect and 
persistent feelings of worthlessness and powerlessness. A large body of research has 
linked depression to ruminative thinking. The most frequent operational definition of 
rumination is that of Nolen-Hoeksema and colleagues, who have defined rumination as a 
style of thinking in which a depressed or dysphoric individual responds to their negative 
mood by focusing on their symptoms and the potential causes and consequences of these 
symptoms in a repetitive, passive, and uncontrolled manner (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; 
Treynor et al., 2003; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). Here, rumination is a style of 
responding to depressed mood, characterized by a passive, repetitive focus on depressive 
symptoms, as well as on the possible causes and consequences of these symptoms. Such 
ruminative thinking can compound and prolong depressive episodes, presumably by 
impairing problem solving, disrupting constructive behavior, and reducing social support 
(Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008).  
Depression usually features deficiencies in memory and attention, and may be 
compounded by ruminative thoughts flooding a depressed individual’s attention. 
Additionally, those prone to rumination may encounter difficulty selecting effective 
approaches to problem solving, instead fixating on ineffective approaches (Nolen-
Hoeksema et al., 2008). Specifically, Joormann and colleagues (Joormann, 2004, 2006, 
2010, Joormann & Gotlib, 2008), have tied depression, and in some cases rumination, to 
deficits in inhibition for emotional material. The primary finding is that there is an 
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inhibitory deficit for negatively valenced emotional material in the presence of 
depression and rumination. However, how these emotionally valenced tasks compare to 
their original non-emotional variants is unclear. This thesis will investigate, in a 
principled manner guided by current literature on inhibitory processing and interference 
control, how rumination, depression, and inhibitory functioning relate for both general 
and emotion-specific material. Furthermore, this thesis will assess how emotional 
selective attention tasks correlate with their non-emotional ancestors. 
Ruminative Responding and Depression. Nolen-Hoeksema and colleagues (Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1987, 1991, 2000; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991, 1993; Lyubomirsky, 
Caldwell, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998; Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993; 1995) 
have found extensive evidence tying rumination to depression. The dominant self-report 
measure of rumination is probably the ruminative responses scale (RRS; Nolen-
Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991), an abbreviated version of the response styles questionnaire 
(RSQ). The RRS is a self-report measure of how frequently an individual engages in 22 
thoughts or behaviors in response to depressed feelings (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008).  
A ruminative response style, as assessed by the RRS, has been found to mediate the 
relationships between risk factors for depression and future major depressive episodes. 
Spasojevi! and Alloy (2001) conducted a 2.5-year study of 137 initially nondepressed 
individuals, assessing depression, rumination, and additional risk factors for depression. 
They found that during the 2.5-year follow-up period, rumination mediated the 
relationship among negative cognitive styles, self-criticism, neediness, and history of past 
major depressive episodes and subsequent major depressive episodes.  
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While the RRS ostensibly measures rumination, many of its items explicitly refer to 
depression. Treynor, Gonzalez, and Nolen-Hoeksema (2003) tried to purge the RRS of 
items blatantly similar to items in the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI). Factor analysis 
revealed two factors in the remaining items: reflection and brooding. Reflection was 
defined as a “purposeful turning inward to engage in cognitive problem solving to 
alleviate…depressive symptoms,” while brooding was defined as “a passive comparison 
of one’s current situation with some unachieved standard” (Treynor et al., 2003). In a 
longitudinal study using the RRS, Treynor and colleagues (2003) found that brooding 
was positively related to depression in both the short- and long-term, while reflection was 
positively related to depression in the short-term, but was negatively related to depression 
in the long run.  
Likewise differentiating brooding and reflective rumination, Joormann, Dkane, and 
Gotlib (2006) showed that currently depressed individuals have higher overall brooding 
scores relative to other individuals. Formerly depressed and socially anxious individuals 
did not differ in brooding, but both scored higher on brooding relative to healthy controls. 
Only currently depressed individuals and healthy controls differed in reflection. Brooding 
also remained elevated after recovery from a depressive episode, and was “particularly 
strongly associated with depressive symptoms, with cognitive biases and, thus, with 
sustained negative affect in depression”. Using a dot-probe task [see below], the authors 
also found that brooding was more strongly associated with cognitive biases than was 
reflective pondering. In light of this all this, it would seem that brooding is almost always 
maladaptive, while reflection may ultimately be (comparatively) helpful. 
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Global Rumination. As has been previously noted, the ruminative response style theory 
of rumination restricts rumination to a coping mechanism for dealing with depressive or 
dysphoric symptoms. According to Brinker & Dozois (2009), rumination must be 
operationalized independently of affective valence in order to study it at a broader level 
than in the context of depression. To do this, they developed the Ruminative Thought 
Style Questionnaire, which measures the ruminative tendencies in the absence of 
depression-laden items, resulting in a single-factor measure with high internal 
consistency. Relative to the RRS, the RTS appears to address a more global ruminative 
thought style. In a 3-week longitudinal study, the RTS was predictive of negative mood at 
both the beginning and end of the observed time period, even after controlling for 
baseline depressed mood (Brinker & Dozois, 2009). Brinker and Dozois proposed that 
rumination rehearses the thoughts held online in focal attention, transferring them from 
working memory to long-term memory. Since these thoughts are now more active in 
long-term memory, they are in turn more accessible to working memory, creating a loop 
that encourages their recurrence.  
It is unclear how the single, general rumination factor tapped by the RTS relates to the 
reflection and brooding subscales of the RRS, which are likely more strongly associated 
with depression and dysphoria. If the degree of control over attention is what separates 
reflection from brooding, then presumably individuals with loosely controlled attention 
should be more likely to engage in brooding/depressive rumination, while those with 
tighter control should be more likely to engage in reflective rumination. As such, the 
global rumination observed by Brinker & Dozois (2009) should show similar correlates 
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to the reflective pondering subscale identified by Treynor et al. (2003), while the 
brooding subscale should behave differentially. 
Inhibitory Deficits in Rumination and Depression. Several tasks have been used to assess 
the relationship among depression and rumination and inhibitory dysfunction. Some of 
the most prominent are the emotional Stroop (1935) task, the dot probe task (MacLeod, 
Mathews, & Tata, 1986), negative priming (Neill et al., 1995), and an “Ignore/Suppress” 
task (Nee & Jonides, 2008). Most often, researchers using these tasks in the context of the 
study of rumination and depression have used emotional/affective stimuli rather than the 
more emotion-free stimuli used for the ‘standard’ versions of these tasks. 
Emotional Stroop. The basic idea of the Stroop task is that words, or nonwords, are 
presented to participants, who are required to name the color in which the stimuli are 
displayed. This task is particularly difficult when a color-naming word is presented in a 
conflicting color, such as BLUE appearing in yellow. Stroop interference is generally 
observed as slowed response times for these incongruent trials, relative to congruent or 
nonword stimuli.  
The emotional Stroop effect refers to a response time slowing when naming the color of 
emotionally-laden words relative to emotionally neutral words (Gotlieb and McCann, 
1984), so it is not directly analogous to the traditional Stroop effect, which is based on 
contrasting response times for congruent and incongruent color stimuli. In spite of this 
difference, both paradigms suffer from a difficulty in isolating the source of their 
respective effects. Gotlib, Yue, and Joormann (2005) argue that it is “virtually 
impossible” to isolate the source of Stroop interference, as it could be due to input 
processes, output processes, or both input and output processes.  
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Another, and perhaps more substantive, problem with the emotional Stroop task is that its 
relationship with depressive mood may not be as robust as one would hope. Peckham, 
McHugh, and Otto (2010) conducted a meta-analysis of 29 studies that used either 
emotional Stroop or the Dot-Probe task to assess inhibitory dysfunction in clinically and 
nonclinically depressed samples, as well as in samples with induced negative mood. They 
found that the emotional Stroop effect was only marginally significantly different for 
depressed versus nondepressed individuals, whereas the Dot-Probe task was significantly 
different for these populations. 
Research by McKenna and Sharma (2004) and Frings, Englert, Wentura, & Bermeitinger 
(2010) suggests that the absence of an overall effect of emotional Stroop for depressed 
individuals compared to those not suffering from depression could be due to differential 
effects based on the source of Stroop interference within the tasks. They distinguish 
between a “fast” and a “slow” effect. The fast effect occurs when emotional stimuli 
capture attention automatically and immediately, within a single trial. The slow effect is 
the emotional interference of the previous trial on the current trial (McKenna & Sharma, 
2004). Manipulating the sequence of negative and neutral trials influences the appearance 
of these two effects, and can even reverse the observed emotional Stroop effect. 
Specifically, a truly random sequence produces the expected fast effect but masks the 
slow effect, which should only be evident on consecutive trials with different emotional 
content (McKenna & Sharma). Ultimately, Mckenna and Sharma found evidence for the 
existence of the slow effect in emotional Stroop, but did not find evidence for the 
traditional fast effect. However, a recent study by Frings et al. (2010) produced evidence 
supporting the presence of both a fast and a slow effect in emotional Stroop. 
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Frings et al. (2010) utilized a version of the emotional Stroop task featuring neutral and 
negative words. In their design, they insured that current trials were uncorrelated with 
their immediate predecessor trials; this allowed them to examine the fast and slow effect 
separately. They found response time evidence for both the fast and slow effect, but did 
not find either effect to be significant using error data. In short, the emotional Stroop 
effect is jointly explained by a fast, within-trials effect, and a slow, across-trials effect. 
Decomposing the emotional Stroop in this way may be more useful, as previously it was 
difficult to isolate the source of the effect (Gotlib, Yue, & Joormann, 2005; MacLeod et 
al., 1986).  
Dot Probe Task. The other most widely used measure of inhibitory dysfunction in the 
literature, according to Peckham et al. (2010), is the dot probe task (MacLeod, Mathews, 
& Tata, 1986). In the dot probe task, two stimuli are presented simultaneously on the 
screen; following the presentation of the stimuli, a probe (in the form of a dot) appears in 
the location of one of the two previously presented stimuli. The participant’s task is to 
indicate the location of the dot with a corresponding keystroke. The dot probe task 
frequently uses emotionally laden stimuli, and the measure of interest is the difference in 
response times for probes following negative and (generally) neutral stimuli (Peckham et 
al., 2010). In their meta-analysis of 22 studies (9 dot probe studies for a total of 12 dot 
probe tasks), Peckham et al. (2010) found that depressed participants reaction times 
differed significantly from nondepressed participants on the dot probe task. Joormann et 
al. (2006) included a dot probe paradigm in their study, and found that an attentional bias 
for negative faces correlated with the brooding subscale of the RRS, but not to the 
reflection subscale. 
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Negative Affective Priming. Perhaps the most prominent attentional inhibition measure in 
the current clinical literature is Joormann’s (2004, 2006) negative affective priming 
(NAP) task. The NAP task is a standard negative priming task, except for the inclusion of 
emotionally valenced material. In the NAP task, participants are usually required to 
identify the emotional valence of the target stimulus, generally a word (Joormann, 2004). 
Emotionally valenced words are presented in paired prime and test trials. In the negative 
priming condition, distractors in the prime trial and targets in the test trial share the same 
emotional valence. In the control condition, the prime trial distractors are unrelated to the 
test trial targets. Joormann (2004) showed that currently and formerly depressed 
individuals displayed an inhibitory deficit specifically for negatively valenced words. 
Joormann (2006) used a similar NAP design, and found that ruminative tendencies were 
closely related to inhibitory dysfunction for material that is irrelevant, emotional, and 
self-referential, be it positively or negatively valenced. Joormann (2006) suggested that 
dysphoria may be specifically related to inhibitory deficits for negative information, 
while rumination may be related to a more general inhibitory deficit for both negative and 
positive information. However, the experiment did not include a neutral condition, which 
would provide stronger evidence of a general deficit. Goeleven et al. (2006) employed an 
NAP paradigm using happy and sad faces as stimuli. They examined never-depressed 
individuals, patients who were hospitalized with major depression, and formerly 
depressed individuals. They found that never-depressed controls showed no inhibitory 
deficits, while currently depressed individuals showed impaired inhibition of negative 
stimuli and normal inhibition for positive material. Formerly depressed individuals were 
impaired at inhibiting both positive and negative stimuli. Surprisingly, Goeleven et al. did 
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not find a relationship between inhibitory deficits and ruminative thinking. Joormann and 
Gotlib (2010) used another NAP task and found results that were generally congruent 
with previous studies, mainly that currently depressed individuals showed reduced 
inhibition for negative material. Zetsche and Joormann (2011) conducted a study that 
used two NAP tasks, one with words and one with faces, as well as an emotional flanker 
task. The two NAP tasks were intended to assess control of interference due to internal 
representations, while the emotional flanker task was intended to assess control over 
interference from external material. They assessed depressive symptoms and rumination 
in an initial session and then again 6 months later. In the initial session, both NAP tasks 
were related to depression, but neither was related to rumination. However, at the 6-
month follow-up, the NAP tasks were predictive of rumination and depression. 
Confusingly, the emotional flanker task was related to rumination during the initial 
session, but was not associated significantly with depression. Joormann, Nee, et al. 
(2010) and Joormann and Gotlib (2008) both found evidence that rumination is related to 
how well individuals are able to discard irrelevant information from working memory. 
Berman, Nee, et al. (2011) used a directed-forgetting style paradigm and found that 
individuals diagnosed with depression, relative to controls, were worse at removing 
negative, but not positive, information from working memory. They also found that 
discarding negative information from working memory was related to rumination, 
possibly more to brooding than reflection.  
When considered together, these studies indicate that depression seems to be associated 
with deficits in controlling access to working memory, but rumination’s role is less clear 
and consistent. Overall, there is reasonable consensus that depressed mood is associated 
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with an attentional bias for negative material. Whether or not this is strictly limited to 
negative material is unclear. 
Non-emotional Inhibition. Although much of the research on inhibitory function in the 
face of depression and rumination has been conducted using emotionally-valenced 
stimuli, there is some evidence of an effect with neutral material. Altamirano, Miyake, 
and Whitmar (2011) examined two executive control tasks, letter naming and Stroop, in 
the presence of rumination and dysphoria. They used the RRS to assess rumination and 
the BDI to assess dysphoria. They found that higher ruminative tendencies (both 
reflection and brooding) predicted lower accuracy on letter naming, whereas higher 
ruminative tendencies predicted better accuracy on rare incongruent trials in their Stroop 
task (which featured 25% incongruent and 75% congruent trials). Dysphoria had a 
negative effect on performance of the Stroop task, even though dysphoria was positively 
related to rumination. The authors argue for a differential relationship between 
rumination and dysphoria regarding goal maintenance. Higher rumination promotes 
better goal maintenance, whereas higher dysphoria promotes worse goal maintenance. 
These findings suggest that there may be a more general relationship between inhibition, 
dysphoria, and rumination. Therefore, it should be informative to examine how 
rumination and depression relate to one’s ability to ignore, or inhibit, irrelevant 
information, be it emotionally charged or neutral, by selectively attend to relevant 
information.  
The Current Study. Given the divided and debated definition of inhibition, I have chosen 
to frame inhibition in terms of interference control, which, based on the research 
discussed above, relates to working memory capacity and the control of attention. Within 
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this framework, the current study examined how depression, global rumination, and 
coping rumination are both interrelated and related to interference control of non-
emotional, sad, and happy emotional material. Based on the discussion above, more acute 
depression should correlate positively with  higher rumination, particularly brooding, as 
well as to increased interference, particularly from mood congruent (i.e., sad) stimuli. 
Rumination is, essentially, a difficulty with regulating the content of one’s thoughts. 
Therefore, rumination, as a whole, should correspond to a general difficulty regulating 
interference. More specifically, depressive ruminators should experience the most 
interference from mood congruent, emotionally sad, stimuli. If global rumination is a 
coherent construct, and we successfully sample non-depressive ruminators, we expect 
these individuals to experience higher interference overall, rather than merely from 




Participants. A total of 255 participants, aged 18 to 35 years, were recruited from the 
undergraduate student population at the Georgia Institute of Technology. After removing 
those who performed below chance on any of the eight selective attention tasks, 222 
participants remained in the sample. Of these, 148 showed no signs of depression (scores 
less than 16 on the CESD-R), while 75 showed evidence of depressive symptoms (scores 
greater than or equal to 16 on the CESD-R). Participants received either course credit or 
payment for their time. 
Materials, Design, and Procedure. Testing took place in a single session, lasting 
approximately 3.5 h. All participants completed all survey items and computer-
administered tasks in the same order to minimize error from participant-by-order 
interaction, as the data were analyzed using a latent variables framework. First, 
participants completed a battery of paper-and-pencil survey measures, beginning with the 
RTS and the RRS rumination measures, and then the CESD-R assessment of depression. 
As previously noted, the RTS is a 20-item measure of ‘global rumination,’ while the RRS 
is a 20-item assessment of rumination as a coping mechanism for depression. The CESD-
R is a 20-item assessment of depressive symptoms. A score less than 16 indicates no 
significant depressive symptoms, while a score greater than or equal to 16 indicates the 
presence of depressive symptoms (http://cesd-r.com/cesdr/). It is worth noting that only a 
clinical interview qualifies for a diagnosis of depression. After completing the surveys, 
participants completed the eight computerized selective attention tasks on a monitor 
approximately 44cm by 28cm, resolution 1680 by 1050. The non-emotional selective 
 13 
attention tasks included a Stroop task, a negative priming task, a Flanker task, and finally 
a dot probe task. The emotional selective attention tasks followed the same structure as 
their non-emotional tasks, but used emotional stimuli, which were happy, sad, or neutral 
words or faces, as described below. Emotional words were drawn from the Affective 
Norms (ANEW; Bradley and Lang, 1999) database. Emotional faces were drawn from 
KEDF (Lundqvist et al., 1998; Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008) database. All tasks were 
participant-paced (within a 5000 ms response window before automatic progression) and 
featured 250 ms fixations. Intertrial intervals were between 250 ms and 1500 ms, 
depending on specific task. Participants were instructed to respond as rapidly and 
accurately as possible.  
Stroop. The non-emotional Stroop task presented three color names (RED, GREEN, 
BLUE) in any of three display colors: green, blue, and red. Stimuli (Courier New, size 18 
font, visual angle between 1.9 and 4.8 degrees) were centrally located, with one word 
presented per trial. Trial types included incongruent, congruent, and neutral trials. 
Incongruent trials were the color names presented in conflicting display colors (i.e., 
“RED” displayed in green). Congruent trials were color names presented in their 
respective display color (i.e., “RED” displayed in red). Neutral trials consisted of 
neutrally valenced words presented in any of the three display colors (i.e., “WOOL” in 
red). Participants had up to 5000 ms to respond and end the trial. Responses were via 
keys marked with the color of the stimulus. There were 1500 ms between each trial. This 
task consisted of three blocks, each with 126 trials, for a total of 378 trials. Within each 
block, there were 42 incongruent, 42 congruent, and 42 neutral trials, so there were 126 
trials of each type, overall. Before completing the main task blocks, participants 
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completed a set of 25 practice trials to familiarize them with response mapping (10 trials) 
and the actual trials (15 trials). Note that, initially, the non-emotional Stroop effect was 
analyzed in terms of both the previously discussed fast and slow effects. The 
manipulation of interest for the fast effect is the median response time difference between 
incongruent trials following neutral trials and neutral trials following neutral trials. The 
manipulation of interest for the slow effect is the difference in median response time 
between neutral trials following incongruent trials and neutral trials following neutral 
trials. However, reliability analyses, discussed in depth in the results section, indicated 
that a traditional approach (i.e., taking the RT difference between neutral and incongruent 
trials) yielded a much more reliable measure. 
Negative Priming. The non-emotional negative priming (NP) task displayed two of three 
letters: A, D, and S (Courier New, size 18 font, visual angle approximately 4.8 degrees 
across), presented in green or olive, on each trial. The target and distractor letters were 
arranged in a diagonal position around central fixation, such that one was always slightly 
above and to the left of fixation with the other to the right and below (as if there were a 
box around central fixation, with one letter in the upper left corner and the other in the 
lower right, visual angle approximately 1.9 degrees across the diagonal of this box). The 
position of the target relative to the distractor varied randomly from trial to trial (that is, 
on any given trial, the target could be in either corner with the distractor in the other). 
Participants were tasked with identifying the olive letter (the target) and ignoring the 
green letter (the distractor). Trials were either control or negative priming trials. In 
control trials, the currently displayed target letter was different from the immediately 
preceding distractor letter. In negative priming trials, the current target letter was the 
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same as the previous distractor letter. Stimuli remained on the screen until response, or 
for 5000 ms. There were 1500 ms between trials. Not counting the first trial in each 
block, there were 120 trials in each of 3 blocks, for a total of 360 trials. On 50% of trials, 
the target is above the distractor. The first block contained 75 control and 44 negative 
priming trials. The second block contained 87 control and 32 negative priming trials. The 
third block contained 75 control and 44 negative priming blocks. Before starting the main 
NP task blocks, participants completed 20 practice trials (10 response mapping trials 
followed by 10 practice trials). The manipulation of interest in the non-emotional 
negative priming task was the difference in median response time between negative 
priming and control trials. 
Flanker. Each trial of the non-emotional Flanker task presented three words (Courier 
New, size 18 font, visual angle between approximately 1.9 and 4.8 degrees) in a vertical 
arrangement (spanning approximate visual angles 1.9 to 4.8 degrees wide by 2.4 degrees 
high, 2.9 to 4.8 degrees at the diagonal) in the center of the screen. The flankers were the 
two outermost words and appeared first. After a brief delay of 500 ms, the target word 
appeared in the center of the screen between the two flankers and remained until response 
or for 5000 ms. The presented words were either living or nonliving nouns or adjectives. 
Participants were tasked with identifying whether the central target was living (L) or not 
(N). In congruent trials, the flankers and target were all either living or nonliving. In 
incongruent trials, the flankers and target did not match on living versus nonliving. This 
resulted in two basic types of trials: congruent trials (i.e., NNN and LLL) and 
incongruent trials (i.e., LYL and YLY). There were three blocks of Flanker trials, each 
with 120 trials in each, for a total of 360 trials in the entire task. Within each block, there 
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were 30 trials of each trial type, so there were 90 trials of each type, total. Participants 
completed 20 practice trials (10 response mapping and 10 practice) before completing the 
main blocks of trials. The manipulation of interest in the non-emotional Flanker task is 
the difference in median response time between incongruent and congruent trials. 
Non-emotional Dot Probe. Each trial of the Non-emotional dot probe presented two 
identical neutrally valenced faces (all faces were portraits, 281 by 381 pixels on the 
screen simultaneously, separated by approximately 9 degrees of visual angle. After 450 
ms, one face flashed off for 100 ms before reappearing, then both faces remained on the 
screen for an additional 450 ms. Both faces were then replaced with a probe (*) centrally 
located behind one of the two faces. Participants had up to 5000 ms to identify whether 
the probe appeared on the left or the right side of the screen. Identical faces were used so 
that attentional capture could only be attributed to the flashing face manipulation. 
Incongruent trials occurred when the flashing face was on the opposite side of the screen 
from the subsequent probe, while congruent trials occurred when the flashing face 
appeared on the same side of the screen as the subsequent probe. There were three blocks 
with 120 trials in each block. Within each block, there were 60 congruent trials and 60 
incongruent trials, for a total of 180 congruent and 180 incongruent trials, overall. Before 
completing the main block of trials, participants completed 25 practice trials (10 response 
mapping trials and 15 practice trials). The manipulation of interest is the median response 
time difference between incongruent and congruent trials. 
Emotional Stroop. Each trial of the emotional Stroop task presented happy, sad, or neutral 
valence words from the ANEW, in red, green, or blue font. Stimuli (Courier New, size 18 
font, visual angle between 1.9 and 4.8 degrees) were centrally located, with one word 
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presented per trial. Participants had up to 5000 ms to identify the color in which the word 
on each trial was presented. There were 1500 ms between trials. There were three blocks, 
with 126 trials per block, for a total of 378 total trials. Within each block, there were 42 
each of happy, sad, and neutral words, for a total of 126 trials of each valence. Before 
completing the three main blocks of trials, participants completed 25 practice trials (10 
response mapping and 15 practice). The emotional Stroop trials were analyzed in terms of 
fast and slow effects, as discussed previously. Specifically, there were four contrasts of 
interest: the fast effect of sad stimuli, the fast effect of happy stimuli, the slow effect of 
sad stimuli, and the slow effect of happy stimuli. The manipulation of interest for the sad 
fast effect was the difference in median response time between sad words following 
neutral words and neutral words following neutral words. The manipulation of interest 
for the fast effect of happy words was the difference in median response time between 
happy words following neutral words and neutral words following neutral words. The 
manipulation of interest for the slow effect of sad words was the median response time 
difference between neutral trials following sad trials and neutral trials following neutral 
trials. The manipulation of interest for the slow effect of happy words was the median 
response time difference between neutral trials following happy trials and neutral trials 
following neutral trials. 
Negative Affective Priming. Each trial of the negative affective priming task presented 
participants with a pair of words (Courier New, size 18 font, visual angle 1.9 and 4.8 
degrees), with the target and the distractor differentiated by color; the target was in olive 
and the distractor was in green. The target and distractor were arranged in a diagonal 
position around central fixation, such that one was always slightly above and to the left of 
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fixation with the other to the right and below (as if there were a box around central 
fixation, with one letter in the upper left corner and the other in the lower right, 
approximate visual angle between 3.8 and 5.7 degrees across the diagonal of this box). 
The position of the target relative to the distractor varied randomly from trial to trial (that 
is, on any given trial, the target could be in either corner with the distractor in the other). 
Participants had up to 5000 ms to indicate whether the valence of the target word was 
happy, sad, or neutral. There were three blocks, each with 120 trials, for a total of 360 
trials in the task. In the first block, there were 77 control, 16 sad, 14 happy, and 12 
neutral negative priming trials. In the second block, there were 87 control, 11 sad, 10 
happy, and 11 neutral negative priming trials. In the third block, there were 75 control, 12 
sad, 15 happy, and 16 neutral negative priming trials. On 50% of trials, the target was 
above the distractor, and the other 50% of trials had the target below the distractor. 
Before completing the main blocks of trials, participants performed 18 response mapping 
and 12 practice trials. There were two contrasts of interest in the negative affective 
priming task: the median response time difference between sad NP trials and control 
trials and the median response time between happy NP trials and control trials. 
Emotional Flanker. Each trial of the Emotional Flanker task presented three words 
(Courier New, size 18 font, visual angle between 1.9 and 4.8 degrees) in a vertical 
column around the central fixation point (spanning approximate visual angles 1.9 to 4.8 
degrees wide by 2.4 degrees high, 2.9 to 4.8 degrees at the diagonal) in the center of the 
screen. The two outermost words are the flankers, and the central word is the target. After 
the 250 ms fixation, the flankers appeared for 500 ms. After this brief delay, the central 
target word appeared between the two flankers. Participants had up to 5000 ms to identify 
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whether the target words were sad, neutral, or happy. There were 126 trials in each of 
three blocks, for a total of 378 trials. Trial types were a combination of the valences of 
the flankers and the target, and are as follows: HHH, HNH, HSH, NHN, NNN, NSN, 
SHS, SNS, and SSS. Within each block, there were 14 trials of each trial type, resulting 
in 42 trials of each type overall. Before completing the main blocks of trials, participants 
completed 25 practice trials (10 response mapping and 15 practice). There were two 
contrasts of interest in the emotional flanker task: the effect of sad distractors, isolated 
with the difference in median response times between SNS and NNN trials, and the effect 
of happy distractors, isolated with the median response time difference between HNH 
and NNN trials. 
Emotional Dot Probe. Each trial of the Emotional dot probe task presented two faces (all 
faces were portraits, 281 by 381 pixels) on the screen simultaneously, separated 
horizontally by approximately 9 degrees of visual angle, for 1000 ms. After the faces 
disappeared, a probe (*) appeared centered behind one of the faces, and participants had 
4000 ms to respond by identifying the side of the screen on which the probe appeared. 
There were six stimulus pairings, which are as follows: Happy-Neutral, Happy-Sad, 
Neutral-Happy, Neutral-Sad, Sad-Happy, and Sad-Neutral. The target probe appeared 
behind either the left or right face in each stimulus pair, with order randomized across 
blocks. There were 120 trials in each of three blocks, for a total of 360 trials overall. 
Within each block, there were 20 trials of each type, for a total of 60 trials of each type 
overall. Participants completed 25 practice trials (10 response mapping followed by 15 
practice trials). There were two contrasts of interest in the emotional dot probe task: the 
difference in median response times between congruent and incongruent trials with happy 
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stimuli and the difference in median response times between congruent and incongruent 








Median reaction times were computed for all task conditions, and difference scores were 
constructed for relevant contrasts. No contrasts between depressive and non-depressive 
mean median RTs were significant for any of the tasks (see Table 1). Cronbach’s Alphas 
were computed for the planned difference scores using the three blocks for each task (see 
Table 1).   
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for SA tasks (N=222). 
Descriptive statistics are based on median reaction times. Means and standard deviations are shown for all task conditions and 
difference scores, for all participants, and split for participants scoring 16 or higher on the CESD-R (Depressive), and for participants 
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I-N 52.31 31.77 0.86 54.80 35.97 0.81 51.09 29.71 0.89 -0.425 0.671 
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S-N -0.04 24.56 0.51 -3.12 23.72 0.55 1.47 24.97 0.48 1.308 0.192 
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S-Cn 31.91 97.59 0.07 33.24 92.92 0.12 31.26 99.88 0.04 -0.199 0.842 
 
H-Cn 16.33 101.07 -0.10 3.84 95.13 -0.01 22.45 
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8 -0.18 1.958 0.051 
 
N-Cn 42.15 106.69 0.34 54.12 
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5 0.41 36.29 
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5 0.29 -1.364 0.174 



































IS-CS -0.08 25.33 -0.39 0.86 29.83 -0.17 -0.55 22.90 -0.57 -0.386 0.7 
 
IH-CH -0.19 -0.08 -0.12 -0.04 16.27 -0.87 -0.26 25.32 0.03 -0.069 0.945 
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Only non-emotional (cognitive) Stroop, non-emotional (cognitive) Flanker had 
Cronbach’s Alphas in excess of 0.7 (0.86 and 0.72, respectively). Non-emotional 
(cognitive) Dot Probe (0.36), Sad Emotional Stroop (0.51), Happy Emotional Stroop 
(0.58), Neutral NAP (0.34), Sad Emotional Flanker (0.45), and Happy Emotional Flanker 
(0.27) had Cronbach’s Alphas above 0.2. All other tasks had Cronbach’s Alphas below 
0.2 and were excluded from final analyses. The survey measures of depression and 
rumination are shown in Table 2.  
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for questionnaires 
 
Surveys 
   
Questionnaire Mean SD 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
RTS 83.6103 16.53953 0.844 
RRS-R 9.973 3.53383 0.747 
RRS-B 10.2691 3.33667 0.753 
RRS-D 25.1081 6.93454 0.846 
CESD-R 13.9626 8.81259 0.723 
 
All survey measures had Cronbach’s Alphas above 0.7. Principal Components Analysis 
(PCA) was conducted using SPSS for all planned difference scores (scree plot in Figure 1 
and structure matrix in Table 3), and then for only difference scores with Cronbach’s 
Alphas exceeding 0.20 (scree plot in Figure 2 and structure matrix in Table 4).  
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Figure 1. Scree plot for all planned difference scores N=222. The scree plot for all 
planned difference scores from a correlation-based principal components analysis, with 
an oblimin rotation, of all subjects (N=222). Values below 0.30 are omitted. 
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Table 3. Structure matrix of all planned difference scores. The structure matrix for all 
planned difference scores from a correlation-based principal components analysis, with 
an oblimin rotation, of all subjects (N=222). Values below 0.30 are omitted. 
 
Component 
     
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
CESD-R 0.785 
     RRS-D 0.865 
     RRS-B 0.819 
     RRS-R 0.735 
     RTS 0.649 
     Stroop 
   
0.72 










  Dot Probe 
    
0.769 
 Emo Stroop Sad 
 
0.849 
   Emo Stroop Happy 
 
0.826 
   NAP Sad 
 
0.353 




   
-0.644 
  NAP Neutral 
  
0.411 
  Emo Flanker Sad 0.879 
    Emo Flanker Happy 0.864 
    Emo DP 
Sad 
     
0.542 
Emo DP Happy 





Figure 2. Scree plot for difference scores with Cronbach’s Alpha > 2.0. The scree plot for 
only difference scores with Cronbach’s Alphas greater than 0.2 from a correlation-based 
principal components analysis, with an oblimin rotation, of all subjects (N=222). Values 
below 0.30 are omitted. 
 29 
Table 4. Structure matrix for difference scores with Cronbach’s Alpha > 2.0. The 
structure matrix for only difference scores with Cronbach’s Alphas greater than 0.2 from 
a correlation-based principal components analysis, with an oblimin rotation, of all 
subjects (N=222). Values below 0.30 are omitted. 
 
Component 
    
 
1 2 3 4 5 
CESD-R 0.79 
    RRS-D 0.865 
    RRS-B 0.822 
    RRS-R 0.734 
    RTS 0.657 
    Stroop 








    
-0.878 
Emo Stroop Sad 
 
0.858 
  Emo Stroop Happy 
 
0.86 
  NAP Neutral 
  
0.528 0.414 
Emo Flanker Sad 0.885 
   Emo Flanker Happy 0.886 
    
Extraction was based on eignevalues greater than or equal to 1.0. A standard direct 
Oblimin rotation was used (Delta = 0). Briefly, all self-report measures formed a single 
component, while the selective attention (SA) task difference scores fell out much more 
sporadically. Since the CESDR, the RTS, and the subsets of the RRS all formed a single, 
strongly unified factor, we were unable to differentiate between types of rumination. Nor 
were we able to differentiate between depression (as assessed by the CESDR) and 
rumination based on these PCA’s. Regarding the individual SA task difference scores a 
single Flanker component clearly emerged, regardless of the happy and sad valenced 
stimuli in the emotional task. However, separate non-emotional (cognitive) and emotional 
components emerged such that non-emotional Stroop and neutral Negative Affective 
Priming (NAP) formed their own component, while the sad and happy valenced 
emotional Stroops formed a single component of their own. 
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Based on these results from the second PCA, structural equation models were constructed 
to examine whether reaction times on non-emotional and emotional selective attention 
tasks were predictive of scores on the self-report measures of rumination and depression. 
The first model (Model 1, see Figure 3) fit a cognitive factor (composed of non-
emotional Stroop and neutral NAP), a Flanker factor (composed of non-emotional and 
emotional Flankers), and an emotional Stroop factor, and used these to predict depression 












































Figure 3. Model 1. Latent variable model, based on all participants (N=222), predicting 
depression (Dep) via rumination (Rum) from a non-emotional cognitive factor (composed 
of Stroop and Neutral Negative Priming). RMSEA = 0.04, CFI = 0.97, Chi-Square(47) = 
65.49, Model AIC = -28.51. Dotted lines represent paths that were not significant at 
Alpha = 0.05. 
 31 
This model fit the data somewhat well, RMSEA = 0.04, CFI = 0.97, Chi-Square(47) = 
65.49, Model AIC = -28.51. However, Neutral NAP failed to load significantly at Alpha 
= 0.05 on the general cognitive factor, and both valences of emotional Stroop failed to 
load significantly on their factor as well. Model 2 (see Figure 4) was constructed by 





























Figure 4. Model 2. 
Latent variable model, based on all participants (N=222), predicting depression (Dep) via 
rumination from non-emotional Cognitive Stroop and a general Flanker factor (composed 
of non-emotional Flanker, sad-valenced emotional Flanker, and happy-valenced 
emotional Flanker tasks). RMSEA = 0.05, CFI = 0.98, Chi-Square(23) = 35.87, Model 
AIC = -10.13 Dotted lines represent paths that were not significant at Alpha = 0.05. 
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Model 2 used non-emotional Stroop and a general Flanker factor, composed of non-
emotional, sad, and happy Flanker trials, to predict scores on the CESD-R via a general 
rumination factor, composed of scores on the RTS and the three subsets of the RRS. This 
model also fit the data fairly well, RMSEA = 0.05, CFI = 0.98, Chi-Square(23) = 35.87, 
Model AIC = -10.13, and all loadings were significantly different from zero at Alpha = 
0.05. However, neither the SA factors in Model 1 nor in Model 2 significantly predicted 
the rumination and depression factors. Rumination was predictive of Depression in both 




The current study set out to examine the relationship among depression, rumination, and 
selective attention, for both emotionally valenced and neutral stimuli, from a latent 
variables perspective. Nonclinical depression was assessed using the CESDR, which 
flagged 74 participants as depressive, out of 222 participants overall. A general non-
emotional attention latent construct did not coalesce, nor did a general emotional 
attention construct. Instead, for the Flanker tasks, trials from the non-emotional task 
version formed a factor along with sad and happy valenced trials from the emotional 
version of the task. That is, the sad and happy trials did not behave differentially from the 
neutral trials, indicating that valence was not a relevant component, at least within the 
Flanker task. The Stroop tasks did not mirror this result, with the non-emotional, 
cognitive Stroop preferring to form its own factor separate from the emotional variants of 
Stroop, which wanted to create their own factor (although these loadings were not 
significantly different from zero at Alpha = 0.05). Overall, I did not observe a causal 
relationship from attention, neither emotional nor non-emotional, to rumination and 
depression. Additionally, global rumination was largely undifferentiated from coping 
rumination in the current study. 
Furthermore, as shown in Table 1, many of the literature’s established emotional 
selective attention tasks failed to meet a minimal reliability threshold of Cronbach’s 
Alpha of at least 0.7 (Lance, Butts, and Michels, 2006), regardless of whether all subjects 
were included in the analyses or depressive and non-depressive subjects were analyzed 
separately. Only the traditional, non-emotional cognitive Stroop task and non-emotional 
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Flanker task, produced effects above this threshold. The negative priming tasks were 
spectacularly unreliable, both non-emotional and negative affective priming. All 
observed variants of the dot probe task were similarly unreliable, and the emotional 
Stroop tasks also fell somewhat below threshold. Some of these issues with reliability are 
not entirely unexpected. Friedman and Miyake (2004) suggested caution in the use of 
negative priming as a measure of individual differences in inhibitory functioning. Zetsche 
and Joormann (2011) only found that NAP was predictive of both rumination and 
depression only at the end of a longitudinal study; at the beginning, the NAP was only 
predictive of depression. Adding to this, their emotional flanker task predicted rumination 
but not depression during the initial session of their study. Nee and Jonides (2008) found 
that negative priming was reasonably related to resistance to proactive interference. 
Similarly, an evaluation of the reliability of the dot probe task conducted by Schmukle 
(2005) found that it had low reliability in a non-clinical sample of anxious individuals. 
Only in clinical samples was it a reliable measure of attentional allocation (for physical 
threats, retest reliability was between -0.22 and 0.32; Schmukle, 2005). However, in the 
current study, Cronbach’s Alpha values were similar regardless of whether all 
participants or only those with CESD-R scores greater than or equal to 16 were included 
in the analyses. Nevertheless, an additional PCA, utilizing the same extraction criteria 
and rotation as the previous PCAs, was conducted solely on the depressive participant 




Figure 5. Scree plot for difference scores with Cronbach’s Alpha > 2.0. Depressive 
subjects only.The scree plot for only difference scores with Cronbach’s Alphas greater 
than 0.2 from a correlation-based principal components analysis, with an oblimin 
rotation, of depressive subjects only (N=73). Values below 0.30 are omitted. 
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Table 5. Structure matrix for difference scores with Cronbach’s Alpha > 2.0. Depressive 
subjects only. The structure matrix of difference scores with Cronbach’s Alphas greater 
than 0.2 from a correlation-based principal components analysis, with an oblimin 
rotation, conducted only on subjects with CESD-R scores greater than or equal to 16 
(N=73). Values below 0.30 are omitted. 
 
Component 
   
 
1 2 3 4 
CESD-R 0.816 
   RRS-D 0.762 
   RRS-B 0.813 
   RRS-R 0.783 
   RTS 0.397 
   Stroop 





  Emo Stroop Sad 
 
0.826 0.331 
Emo Stroop Happy 
 
0.861 
 NAP Neutral -0.409 
  Emo Flanker Sad 0.868 
  Emo Flanker Happy 0.819 
   
This PCA included only difference scores for tasks with Cronbach’s Alphas at or above 
0.2 (see Table 1 for reliability data). The results of this PCA were used to inform the 
creation of two new latent variable models (3 and 4). Model 3, shown in Figure 6, 
attempted to predict rumination using non-emotional Stroop, a general Flanker factor 
(composed of non-emotional Flanker, sad-valenced emotional Flanker and happy-
valenced emotional Flanker trials), and emotional Stroop (composed of sad and happy 






































Figure 6. Model 3. Latent variable model, based only on depressive participants (N=73), 
predicting rumination from non-emotional Cognitive Stroop, a general Flanker factor 
(composed of non-emotional Flanker, sad-valenced emotional Flanker, and happy-
valenced emotional Flanker trials), and emotional Stroop (composed of sad and happy 
stimulus trials). RMSEA = 0.01, CFI = 1.00, Chi-Square(29) = 29.19, Model AIC = -
28.81. Dotted lines represent paths that were not significant at Alpha = 0.05. 
 
This model fit the data fairly well, RMSEA = 0.01, CFI = 1.00, Chi-Square(29) = 29.19, 
Model AIC = -28.81. However, the factor loadings for the non-emotional Stroop tasks 
were not significant at Alpha=0.05, so they were removed, resulting in Model 4 (shown 


























Figure 7. Model 4. Latent variable model, based only on depressive participants (N=73), 
predicting rumination from non-emotional Cognitive Stroop and a general Flanker factor 
(composed of non-emotional Flanker, sad-valenced emotional Flanker, and happy-
valenced emotional Flanker trials). RMSEA = 0.05, CFI = 0.98, Chi-Square(17) = 19.76, 
Model AIC = -14.244. Dotted lines represent paths that were not significant at Alpha = 
0.05. 
 
Model 4 sought to predict rumination using only non-emotional Stroop and the same 
general Flanker factor from Model 3. This model also fit the data fairly well, RMSEA = 
0.05, CFI = 0.98, Chi-Square(17) = 19.76, Model AIC = -14.244. All factor loadings 
were significant at Alpha=0.05, but for both Models 3 and 4, the paths predicting 
rumination from the selective attention factors were not different from zero at 
Alpha=0.05. In short, examining only depressive participants did not produce differential 
results from those obtained when the entire sample was utilized. 
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Another potential concern is that the median RTs for many of the measures in the current 
study fall roughly between 500 and 600 ms, which could be driving the low task 
correlations via restriction of range, which in turn damage the applicability of latent 
variables analysis. Finally, tasks such as Stroop require that difference scores be analyzed 
to isolate the effect of interference. Difference scores are inherently unreliable (Cronbach 
and Furby, 1970) but are commonly used when assessing selective attention and 
inhibition in the context of depression and rumination. 
To reiterate, the present study did not find selective attention tasks, cognitive nor 
emotional, to be predictive of rumination and depression. None of the emotional tasks 
included in this study produced effects with Cronbach’s Alphas above 0.70, with only the 
non-emotional Stroop and Flanker tasks exceeding this threshold. Furthermore, existing 
self-report measures of rumination may not be satisfactorily free from depressive items, 
as the more recent RTS, purported to be a measure of global rumination, formed a single 
factor with all three subsets of the RRS (depressive, brooding, and reflective). In this 
study, rumination formed a construct largely undifferentiated by whether or not it was 
framed as a response to depression or a general tendency to repetitively process 
information. One’s ability to control one’s attention seems to be unrelated both to one’s 
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